Professor P.A.J. Waddington The University of Reading England

Apresentação em tema: "Professor P.A.J. Waddington The University of Reading England"— Transcrição da apresentação:

1 Professor P.A.J. Waddington The University of Reading England
O Fuzilamento de Jean Charles de Menezes: Uso da Força e Ação Anti-terrorista Professor P.A.J. Waddington The University of Reading England

2 Jean Charles de Menezes
Jean Charles de Menezes foi baleado pela polícia de Londres em 22 de Julho Estação subterrânea Stockwell Confundido como terrorista Recebeu múltiplos tiros na cabeça Tragédia On July 22nd 2005 Jean Charles de Meneze was killed by police in London at Stockwell underground station as he tried to board an underground train. He had been mistaken for a terrorist and suffered multiple shops to the head. It was by any standards a tragedy, for Jean Charles was wholly innocent. He was not a terrorist, nor associated in anyway with terrorism. The suffering that this incident must have caused his family can only be imagined and for what it is worth allow me to extend my sympathy to them in their grief.

3 Jean Charles de Menezes
Essa apresentação: somente informações disponíveis publicamente Investigação oficial permanece confidencial Sem fontes ‘privadas’ Ação divulgada e implicações I want to make it clear that this presentation relies entirely on publicly available information only. The official investigation into this incident has yet to be completed and remains confidential. The Crown Prosecution Service is currently considering the findings of an investigation conducted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission. I have access to no personal or unofficial sources other than information available in the public media. I intend to cast no new light on the events of the 22nd July. What I intend to do is to consider the wider policy issues and their implications.

4 Contexto 7 de Julho: homem-bomba—3 metrôs e ônibus bombardeados no centro de Londres—56 mortos 21 de Julho: bomba encontrada em metrôs e ônibus Ataques frustrados ainda aguardvam investigação Ameaça Jihadist: 9/11 (ataque de 1993) Bali, Casablanca, Madrid, Istanbul Strasburg, Singapore Let us begin by considering the context within which these events took place. On the 7th July suicide bombers had detonated 4 bombs aimed at the London transport system. Three trains and one bus were bombed with the loss of 56 lives. The City of London was brought to a virtual standstill. On the 21st July terrorist again attacked the London transport system placing bombs on trains and buses. Fortunately these bombs failed to detonate, but the terrorists had escaped and possibly had the intention of mounting a further attack. This initiated the largest policing operation the Metropolitan police has ever conducted. But there was also wider context. These attacks had taken place against the background of a much wider Jihadist threat: it came of course in the wake of 9/11, but we should also recognise successive terrorist attacks the taken place in Bali, Casablanca, Madrid, Istanbul, Moscow, and elsewhere. The Metropolitan police had previously intercepted several potentially deadly attack by Jihadists some of whom were awaiting trial at the time of the London bombings. Not to mention the thwarted attacks on the Strasburg Christmas Market in December 2000 and on Singapore in Jihadism was, and remains, a real threat

5 Ameaça Jihadist e a ‘guerra contra o terrorismo’?
9/11, et al: crime ou guerra? O Terrorismo não é crime e os terroristas são: Dedicados, determinados, dispostos ao sacrifício próprio Motivados por ideais Implacáveis Não é guerra: Não representa o estado de nenhuma nação Não subscreve tratados internacionais Inexistência de grupos para negociar a paz The wider issue raised by Jihadism is whether it is a criminal conspiracy or an act of war. President George Bush has famously coined the term "the War on Terror" which has provoked criticism from many quarters. However it is clear to me that whatever it is, it is not crime: Jihadist's are dedicated, determined, and self-sacrificing in ways are rarely found amongst criminals. They are motivated by ideals—ideals that we may not share, nor be shared by many Moslems, but ideals nonetheless. And this makes them far more dangerous than mere criminals, for they are utterly ruthless in the prosecution of what they regard as warfare. Equally, it is not a war, for Jihadist's represent no nation state (indeed, they regard the nation state has an alien imposition); nor are they signatories to any international treaty. Crucially, and unlike previous terrorist groups, they appear to have no political representation—no political movement, political party, or representative organisation of any kind. There is no one with whom to negotiate. They offer us the prospect of either succumbing or defeating them by force — kill or be killed.

6 Guerra Irregular 1º princípio desta guerra: atacar o oponente no ponto mais fraco Ocidente é invencível no campo de batalha Fraqueza do liberalismo secular: Individualismo: anonimato, liberdade de movimentação—camuflagem Direitos: vigilância, detenção, força Ceticismo no Estado The dichotomy of 'war' and 'crime' simply fails to accommodate forms of violence that we describe has 'terrorism'. I take the view, shared with others, that these activities are best regarded as a form of irregular warfare. Combatants in such conflicts regard themselves as soldiers fighting a war and in many ways, though by not meet all, they are correct. Certainly they adopt the first principle of war—to attack one's opponent at their weakest point. It would be futile and irrational for those who oppose western hegemony to do so on a conventional battlefield, for the might of modern armies is such they would overwhelmed. The West is invincible on the battlefield, but it has its weak points too and it is those points that Jihadist's seek to exploit. The weakness of secular liberalism lies within itself. Its individualism affords anonymity and freedom of movement that provides ample camouflage for those who attack it from within. Adherence to the idea of rights limits the capacity of democratic states to subject the civil population to too intrusive surveillance, unwarranted detention, and the use of force. And in many democratic societies a culture of scepticism towards the state has developed which both doubts the extend and nature of any terrorist threat, and measures proposed to counter it. It is no accident that terrorism is directed at democratic western societies more often than it is directed at oppressive authoritarian societies. Democracy simply affords greater opportunity in which the terrorist can operate.

7 Inteligência ‘Inteligência’: eufemismo para informação ‘pobre’
Empenho terrorista em permanecer no anonimato ‘Joining up the dots’ ‘Agulha no palheiro’ Falsas verdades Tomada de decisões em tempo real The principal weapon available to the state in defending itself against terrorism is intelligence. It is often claimed that the phrase "military" or "police intelligence" is an oxymoron. There is considerable truth in this for "intelligence" is a euphemism for poor information. Intelligence is sometimes described as "joining up the dots". This is true, but what is important about that phrase is that all that an intelligence analyst has to go on are "dots" and that "joining them up" requires inference and imagination — a process that is doomed to be error prone. Error is likely to be compounded by the fact that identifying terrorists is like searching for the proverbial "needle in the haystack". The problem with searching for needles in haystacks is the size of the haystack: as we have seen repeatedly in the wake of terrorist outrages, there is often ample information prior to the event that those who intended to commit it were behaving suspiciously. The problem is that vast numbers of people behave in ways which retrospectively may be considered to have been suspicious and to have indicated the likelihood of them committing a terrorist attack. The problem for intelligence analysts is the abundance of false positives. When all these problems must be confronted in real time then the wonder is that terrorists are ever intercepted prior to committing their acts.

8 22 de Julho: Falha da Inteligência?
Endereço conectado a bombas encontradas Vigilância Fotografia ruim do bombardeio, Osman Possibilidade de visibilidade Confirmação sobre os movimentos Given all these problems it seems to me that the word "failure" is inextricably associated with the word "intelligence". And so it proved on 22nd July. The police had recovered information from the unexploded bombs that led them to address in South London, which they placed under surveillance. But who were they looking for? The best information they had was a poor, grainy photograph of one of the suspected bombers taken from a surveillance camera on board a bus that was the target. Armed with this information surveillance officers saw Jean Charles leave the premises but were unable to make a positive identification, one way or the other. During a short journey to the Stockwell tube station attempts were made to make a positive identification. Fatefully, they got it wrong! An error prone process had produced mistake.

9 22 de Julho: falha do comando?
Mito do comando panóptico Comandantes inevitavelmente operam ‘cegos’ Má informação inevitável Desestruturada Fluída Incompleta Some critical attention has focused on what was seen as command failures. At Scotland Yard a senior officer acted as the DSO with responsibility to deploy armed officers and authorise the use of lethal force. However to imagine that anyone in that position could direct officers on the ground is to succumb to the myth of "panoptical command" — a Hollywood image of an all seeing, all knowing super intelligence. The reality is that any commander in such a position is inevitably operating blind. They are in receipt of a unstructured, fluid, and incomplete information from those on the ground. Inevitably they know less than the sum of all the knowledge available to those whom they notionally command. They do not have, nor can they have, "the complete picture".

10 22 de Julho: falha organizacional?
Vigilância oficial desarmada Encontro de policiais armados Frequências de rádio diferentes So was it and organisational failure? Certainly, it has long been a complaint that police radios do not work in large sections of a London Underground system. But a far greater question arises over the separation of function between surveillance officers and their armed colleagues. The London police are not routinely equipped with firearms. The surveillance officers would not have been armed and therefore in no position to intercept a suspected suicide bomber. Armed operations are conducted by specialist officers. The cost of this separation of function was twofold: armed officers had to rendezvous with their surveillance colleagues as the latter pursued their target. The result was that they were late arriving; Jean Charles had already boarded the train. This meant that those officers were faced with acute dilemma: shoot and kill an innocent man or allow a suspected suicide bomber to continue his mission. The second implication of the separation of function was that the armed officers would have had no knowledge of any doubts harboured by their surveillance colleagues about the identity of Jean Charles. When those officers entered the train they were, in all likelihood, confident that they were dealing with a suicide bomber.

11 22 de Julho: força excessiva?
‘Kratos’: presunção exagerada de rendição Prisão criminal Combatentes emboscados Loughgall Homens-bomba detonam explosivos 'Operation Kratos' overrides the normal presumption with which armed officers operate in Britain, namely that they will seek to achieve the surrender of a suspect. In dealing with criminals police seek to arrest; in defeating enemy combatants, soldiers seek to eliminate the threat they pose. One does not arrest an enemy, one ambushes them. This is what happened in 1986 at Loughgall in Northern Ireland when SAS troopers ambushed and active service unit of a PIRA.

12 22 de Julho: força excessiva?
Dano letal: ‘Suniland’ e a ‘arma descarregada’ ‘Tiro na cabeça catastrófico’: opção de rotina Prevenção ao ‘tiro de reação’ = vários brainstem Armas lentas Matar não é suficiente Ataque no ponto mais fraco: força o Estado a responder ameaçadoramente Is "Kratos" an excessive use of force? Experience teaches us that opponents can continue to fight and pose a threat despite suffering enormous, even fatal, injuries. Following their experience at Suniland, Florida, in 1986, when bank robber killed three federal officers after suffering three nonsurvivable injuries himself, the FBI changed its tactics to what is called the "empty gun". Of course, firing multiple shots at a target is very likely to prove fatal. This is even more so when shots are aimed at the head. However, the "catastrophic head shot" is a standard tactic in every police force with which I am familiar. In Britain police snipers are required to exhibit sufficient accuracy as to hit the head at 50 and 100 metres. This is in order that they can prevent a hostage taker from firing a reaction shot into a hostage. A high velocity bullet striking a person's head would almost inevitably kill them. Indeed in these circumstances, as in the situation of a suicide bomber, killing is not enough. Preventing a reaction shot or the destination of a bomb requires the destruction of the brain stem. However low velocity bullet's have a far less catastrophic impact even on the head, even at close range. Only by firing multiple shots will a target be immediately incapacitated.

13 Resumindo Ataque terrorista no ponto mais fraco: permite ao oponente uma única opção bem sucedida Matar terrorista armado em flagrante Outras opções: Falhar ao prevenir suspeita de ataque terrorista Matar uma pessoa inocente For the terrorist who seeks to attack the state at its weakest point this is the desired outcome: suicide bombing forces the state to adopt aggressive (and for the watching public, repulsive) tactics. Terrorism generally places the state in a position where there is only one successful option and many that are either not successful, or positively counter-productive. The only successful outcome is to intercept and kill a terrorist in flagrante. To be too conservative and abstain from taking action and thereby failing to prevent a terrorist attack would be an abdication duty. To be too aggressive and take action (especially fatal action) where action is not needed represents a threat to the public whom the state is duty bound to protect. It is an attack at the weakest point.

14 Legitimidade Tilly: legitimidade do estado está baseada em:
Capacidade Confiança Capacidade de proteger a pátria contra ataque, (ataques da força aérea inglesa contra cidades alemães em 1940 Confiança que a força coercitiva não será usada contra cidadãos, ou seja, é utilizada para preservar a justiça Terrorism strikes at both Charles Tilly has recently argued that state legitimacy is founded on two pillars: capacity and trust. The capacity of modern states has expanded enormously over the past two centuries, but it is founded primarily upon the ability to protect the homeland from attack. For instance, when Churchill ordered the bombing of the German cities in 1940 he did so explicitly to demonstrate to the German people that the Third Reich could not protect them however mighty its army. The twin of capacity is trust, for capacity can represent a threat as well is offering protection. States need to convince their civil population that coercive power will not be used arbitrarily or unnecessarily against them, hence the safeguards embodied in procedures of criminal justice.

15 Ameaça terrorista a legitimidade
Entendendo errado: Demonstração de falta de capacidade Crítica pública sobre: Design das torres gêmeas Prontidão/equipamento do departamento de bombeiros/polícia ‘Falha da inteligência’ Confiança Minada Brutalidade policial Perda de controle ‘Atirar pra matar’, ‘execução’, etc Atacar oponente no ponto mais fraco It is capacity and trust that are the targets of terrorism. If the state gets it wrong then it either demonstrates a lack of capacity or it undermined trust. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack states are likely to be subject to criticism that they failed to protect their citizens adequately. For example, it is alleged that the construction of Twin Towers left it vulnerable to collapse; that fire and police equipment was unsatisfactory; and that intelligence failures prevented detection of the threat. When police shoot innocent person trust is undermined: police are accused of being brutal and "out of control". The shooting is described as "shoot to kill", an "execution", and so forth. In demonstrating lack of capacity and undermining trust terrorists attack the state at its weakest point.

16 Acidentes acontecem 2000 pessoas morrem anualmente em hospitais por ‘acidentes médicos’ 30% das que morrem em UTI são diagnósticadas equivocadamente 50% das diagnosticadas equivocadamente poderiam sobreviver com um diagnóstico correto Conceito de ‘Sociedade de Risco’: aversão ao terror Terrorists also benefit from the increasing aversion to accidents. Beck has described modern societies as "risk society" which is aversive error, threat and unpredictability. However, error and accidents are inevitable and sometimes fatal. A recent report of the Audit Commission in Britain revealed that more than 2000 patients die annually in British National Health Service hospitals as a result of medical accidents. Research conducted in one hospital revealed that 30 percent of those who died in ITU were wrongly diagnosed on admission into Accident and Emergency, and that 50% of those who were misdiagnosed would have survived had the diagnosis been accurate. However the fact is that not all risks, not even all lethal risks, are the same in the public mind. When a doctor makes a mistake of diagnosis he or she may be assumed to be trying to help the patient. When a police officer fires multiple shots into the wrong man's head that can only be an act of violence.

17 Ataque no ponto mais fraco
Democracia Terrorismo mina legitimidade Ira das vítimas Campanhas / simpatizantes Mídia Investigação oficial/revelação Ataque no ponto mais fraco Tilly argues that trust is uniquely enhanced through institutions of democracy. Here the terrorist turns weakness into strength, and turns democracy against itself. For terrorism uses the institutions of democracy as a weapon to undermined trust by proxy. The understandable anger of victims (be they the victims of terrorism directly, or the victims of police action against terrorists) is used to challenge state legitimacy. Campaigners and sympathisers can be relied upon to give voice to that anger. And the media will act as a willing channel of communication. Official investigation will also produce revelations (as did the Senate committee on 9/11) that will undermined trust. It is an attack on democracy at its weakest point.

18 Extender capacidade Engendrar confiança
‘Estado de Emergência Terrorista’ Ratificação de leis internacionais Redução legítima da liberdade How can the democratic state defend itself against the terrorist threat? Well first we need to recognise, as the terrorists implicitly recognise, the weaknesses as well as the strengths of democracy. Democracies must also reinforce public trust by acknowledging the scale of the threat and taking steps to counter it. Perversely, I believe that this is best done by the formal declaration of a "State of Terrorist Emergency" and subjecting such a declaration to appropriate international ratification so that citizens may be reassured that limitations of their civil liberties are appropriate and proportionate.

19 Intolerância irremediável ao terror
‘Efeito colateral’ Sacrifício de vidas inocentes Guerra é sempre bárbara Conviver com barbaridade não é liberalismo Atacar no ponto mais fraco But there are always weaknesses and the greatest of them in this context is the irremediable intolerance of error. All warfare, whether conventional or irregular, incurs "collateral damage". The tragic reality is that there will be more innocent people who are killed, not by terrorists, but by agents of the state seeking to defeat terrorism. Worse than that, states will find themselves faced with decisions in which they deliberately have to sacrifice innocent lives. This may involve shooting down a passenger aircraft in order to prevent it being used as a missile as happened on 9/11. War, whether conventional or irregular, is always barbarous and living with barbarity is always illiberal. That's why terrorism is an attack on the democratic state at its weakest point.